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I. INTODUCTIONO n March 4, 1986, H.R. 4300, The Family & Medical Leave Act of
19861 was introduced in the United States House of Representa-
tives. 2 The purpose of the bill is "to entitle employees to parental leave in
H.R. 4300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)[hereinafter H.R. 4300].
Representative William Clay, (D-Missouri), introduced the bill which was originally
titled the Parental and Medical Leave Act. The bill was referred jointly to the Committee
on Education and Labor and the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Both
Committees ordered that the bill be favorably reported. No further action was taken before
the close of the second session of the 99th Congress. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1986:
Hearing on HR. 4300 Before the Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
99-699 Part 2 12-14 (1986)[hereinafter Committee Report].
Since the original writing of this Note, H.R. 4300 has been reintroduced in the 100th
Congress and is now known as H.R. 925. Representative Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado)
reintroduced the bill on February 3, 1987. As with H.R. 4300, the bill was referred jointly
to the House Committee on Education and Labor Subcommittees on Labor-Management
Relations and Labor Standards as well as the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service Subcommittees on Civil Service and Compensation and Employee Benefits. The
Subcommittee on Labor Management Relations and the subcommittee on Labor Standards
have held two joint meetings on H.R. 925. On May 13, 1987, the subcommittee on Labor
Management Relations passed the bill and reported it to the full committee on Education
and Labor. On April 2, 1987, the subcommittee on Civil Service and Compensation and
Employee Benefits held ajointhearing and both subcommittees passed the bill and reported
it to the full committee. While H.R. 4300 has been reintroduced as H.R. 925 the bill remains
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cases involving the birth, adoption, or serious health condition of a son or
daughters and temporary medical leave in cases involving the inability
[of an employee] to work because of a serious health condition."4 The bill
requires an employer to provide up to 18 weeks job-protected family leave
and up to 26 weeks job protected medical leave for all temporarily
disabled employees. 5
The scope of this Note is limited to an examination of the family leave
provisions of H.R. 4300.6 The examination will begin with a study of the
demographic rationale for implementing a national policy of this magni-
tude. This demographic rationale encompasses demographic changes in
society and the interplay between those changes and current employment
policies. This will be followed by an analysis of the existing law beginning
with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 7 and continuing through the
recent Supreme Court decision in California Federal Savings and Loan v.
Guerra.8 Next, this Note will present an overview of H.R. 4300's provi-
sions for family leave. Finally, this Note will examine some of the
arguments which have been raised in opposition to H.R. 4300.
The purpose of this Note is to educate the reader on the current status
of the law regarding maternity leave and family leave9 and to demon-
strate the need for H.R. 4300 based upon recent demographic changes,
current employment policies, and the inability of current law to ade-
quately address the needs of the modern American family.
H. THm DrmooRAPmc RAnONALE
A. Demographic Changes in Society
Over the past twenty five years the United States has experienced a
demographic revolution.' 0 The "typical American family," i.e. father
wage earner, mother at home, has become atypical. Such situations
currently represent less than 10% of all American families." To a great
the same. Accordingly, because of the references used when this Note was originally
written, this Note will continue to refer to the bill as H.R. 4300.
1 The Committee on Education and Labor revised the bill to include an entitlement to
family leave to care for a dependent parent with a serious health condition. See Committee
Report, supra note 2 at 51.
4 Committee Report, supra note 2 at 12.
5 H.R. 4300, supra note 1 §§ 103 and 104.
6 Hereinafter "H.R. 4300" refers only to those provisions ofthe bill applicable to family
leave.
42 U.S.C. 2000e(k)(1982)[hereinafter the PDA].
s 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
g While related, the terms family leave and maternity leave are not synonymous. For
an explanation of the distinction, see infra note 39.
10 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 15.
'1 N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986 § 12A, col. 4.
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extent this change is a result of the large influx of women into the labor
force.12 However, there are other factors which have contributed to this
change.' 3
Currently, 96% of all fathers and over 60% of all mothers are in the
labor force.14 Between 1950 and 1981 the number of women in the labor
force has tripled.15 By 1981, the percentage of women with preschool aged
children who worked outside the home was greater than the percentage
of married women with no minor children who worked outside the home
in 1950, and greater than the percentage of all women in the labor force
in 1900.16 Further, almost 50% of all mothers with children under one
work outside the home' 7 and 67% of women with children under three are
in the labor force.' s Of all the women in the work force, 70% are in their
prime child bearing years.' 9 It is estimated that 85% of those women will
have at least one child while they are in the labor force. 20
The majority of women work out of economic necessity and are not able
to choose between staying home with their children and earning a
living.2 ' The most recent statistics reveal that 27% of married women
have husbands who make less than $10,000 a year and 41% of married
women are married to men who make less than $15,000 a year.22
Additionally, due to the high divorce rate and the increase in the number
of births out of wedlock, the percentage of households headed by females
is increasing. In 1984 women headed 10.3 million or 16% of all American
families.23
In addition to the changes outlined above, there are two other demo-
graphic changes at which H.R. 4300 is aimed. The first is the aging of our
population and the unique problems associated with this phenomenon.24
12 See Committee Report, supra note 2.
"s The high divorce rate and increase in number of births out of wedlock have also
contributed to the demographic changes. Committee Report, Id. at 15.
24 Id.
16 Id.
10 Id.
17 Id.
" PARENTAL AD MEDIcAL LEAvE H.R. 4300 BmnrG PAPER, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1986)[hereinafter BlpuEns PAPER].
" Newsletter, Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, The Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1986: H.R. 4300 (1986)(available from Congressional Caucus for Women's
Issues, Washington, D.C.)[hereinafter Caucus Newsletter].
20 9 to 5 National Association of Working Women, Fact Sheet on Parental Leave
(1986)(available from 9 to 5 National Headquarters, Cleveland, Ohio). Additionally, the
Congressional Budget Office estimates that by 1990 more than 91% of all women of
childbearing years will be in the workforce. Id.
21 Caucus Newsletter, supra note 19.
22 Id.
' See Committee Report, supra note 2, at 15.
24 Id.
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Presently, there are over 2.2 million people who render unpaid care to
ailing family members.2 Thirty-eight percent of the care givers are the
children of the elderly while 35% are their spouses. The average age of
the care giver is 57.26 Further, it is estimated that by the year 2025 the
number of elderly needing health care in this country will be twice the
number of children under five years old.27 Thus, it is imperative that any
legislation aimed at addressing the needs of the American family makes
provisions for an employee to take leave to care for the elderly as well as
the young.
The second trend which H.R. 4300 attempts to address is the
deinstitutionalization of the physically and mentally handicapped.28 An
increasing number of families are caring for their handicapped members
at home.2 9 The reason for the move toward home health care is twofold.
The first is the expense of institutionalization and the second is the belief
that in some instances institutionalization is not in the best interest of
the patient or the family.30 The proponents of H.R. 4300 hope that its
provision will help ease the enormous burden of caring for a handicapped
person.
These demographic changes have had a profound impact on the
American family and the role of the family in society. Traditionally, the
family, and more specifically the wife, has cared for the children, elderly
and ill in our society. However, with the majority of women in the labor
force, the family is becoming increasingly unable to perform its caregiv-
ing function. Thus, we now have a void in our society which we have only
begun to study and understand.31 However, the studies which have been
conducted thus far indicate that if the United States refuses to adapt its
policies to this changing reality the societal costs could be enormous.3 2
Before recommending the passage of H.R. 4300, the Committee on
Education and Labor heard testimony from a number of individuals who
testified as to the frustration they felt and the compromises they made
when forced to choose between their families and their jobs.33
Lorraine Poole, an employee of a large municipality, was unable to
accept a long awaited adoptive baby due to her employer's leave policy.
The adoption agency told Poole that she would not be able to adopt the
child unless she could assure the agency that she would be able to take
time off from work to be with the baby. Poole's employer, however, told
' See Caucus Newsletter, supra note 19.
26 See Committee Report, supra note 2, at 15.
27 Id. at 51.
28 Id. at 15.
' Committee Report, supra note 2, at 15.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 15-16.
31 See Committee Report, supra note 2, at 12.
- Id. at 13-14.
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her she would lose her job if she took any time off from work. Thus, Ms.
Poole had no choice but to forego adopting her long awaited child.34
Iris Elliot, a working mother with a preschool aged child and an infant,
testified as to the problems she faced when her infant became seriously
ill. Elliot's employer, a major corporation, had no family leave policy,
when Elliot asked for leave to care for her seriously ill infant she was
offered 90 days personal leave without pay and without job protection.
However, Elliot was unable to utilize the leave because she could not risk
losing her job or her benefits as she was the sole medical insurance
carrier for the family. At the end of her testimony, Ms. Poole stated, "No
parent should ever have to be torn between nurturing their seriously ill
child and reporting to work like I did."35
The above are merely two examples of the difficult choices which must
be made every day by working parents. However, it is important to
remember that these problems are not merely the problems of isolated
individuals, but rather are representative of a much broader societal
problem. As the Committee reports:
Society has long depended on the family to [meet] these needs and
being able to provide such care has supported and strengthened
families. Depriving families of their ability to meet such needs
seriously undermines the stability of families and the well being
of individuals with both economic and social costs. 3 6
Additionally, a number of experts testified as to the extent of the
problem and the need for a solution. Meryl Frank, director of the Infant
Care Leave Project of the Yale Bush Center in Child Development and
Social Policy, reporting on the findings of the Projects Advisory Commit-
tee on Infant Care Leave stated that the "infant care leave problem in the
United States is of a magnitude and urgency to require immediate
national attention."37 The Advisory Committee recommended six months
minimum leave, with partial wage replacement for the first three
months, and benefit continuation and job protection for the entire
period.38
Dr. T. Barry Brazelton, associate professor of pediatrics at Harvard
University and Dr. Eleanor S. Szanton, Executive Director of the Na-
tional Center for Clinical Infant Programs testified as to the importance
of parental leave39 in the development of the child. Dr. Szanton stated:
34 Id. at 16.
3r Id.
36 Committee Report, supra note 2 at 16.
37 Id. at 17.
38 Id.
9 Parental leave or family leave, is a leave of absence designed to allow parents time
with the new child in their lives. Unlike "maternity leave [which] consists of a period of
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While children require careful nurturing throughout their
development, the formation of loving attachments in the earliest
months and years of life creates an emotional "loot system" for
future growth and development... In short, these factors affect
the baby's cognitive, emotional, social, and physical develop-
ment . . . Once parents and babies develop a solid attach-
ment ... the transition to work and child care is likely to be
easier for parent and child.40
Thus, one can see that inadequate parenting leave has ramifications
beyond the individual. First, it is obviously in the best interest of society
to provide a period of time during which this "root system" can be
developed as well adjusted and productive children are crucial to our
future. Second, it is in the best interest of the employer to have their
employees feel comfortable with their child and their child's day care as
this is likely to lower the number of employees who do not return to work,
and the rate of absenteeism among those who do.41
In reaching its decision, the Committee also considered the findings of
the Economic Policy Council of the United Nations Association of the
United States of America which consisted of corporate executives, union
presidents, and academics. 42 The Economic Policy Council studied the
economic and demographic trends affecting the American family and
labor force.43 It was recommended that six to eight weeks job protected
maternity leave be given with partial wage replacement; six months job
protected unpaid parental leave; job protected disability leave; temporary
disability insurance for all workers; and the establishment of a national
commission on contemporary work and family patterns.44
B. The Current Availability of Parental Leave
Over 100 countries, including many developing countries and every
industrialized country in the world, except the United States, provide job
leave from work to accommodate the woman's physical recuperation and to allow some time
for early infant care, (parental] leave is a broader and more equitable concept for both men
and women." Caucus Newsletter, supra note 19, at 2. Separating childbearing from
childrearing is more equitable for a number of reasons. First, it allows fathers to actively
participate in parenting. Similarly, it allows parents who adopt or become foster parents to
take the time needed to adjust to their new child. Finally, separating childbearing from the
role as primary care giver frees women from the role of primary care giver which in many
instances has forced them to choose between their child and economic livelihood. Id.
40 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 17.
4' See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
42 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 17.
"' The Economic Policy Council published their finding in a report issued in December
1985 entitled, Work and Family in the United States: A Policy Initiative.
44 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 17.
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protected leave with partial or full wage replacement. 45 In the United
States, the granting of leave rests entirely within the discretion of the
employer. As a result, while some employees are adequately covered
many are not.
Recently, a number of studies have been conducted which examine the
leave policies of various employers in the United State. However, there is
presently no comprehensive study of the range of family leaves offered by
U.S. employers.46 Catalyst, a nonprofit research organization, conducted
a study of the leave policies of Fortune 1500 companies and published
their findings in Report on a National Study of Parental Leave. 47
Catalyst reported that of the companies which responded, 51.8% offered
some unpaid, job protected leave for women. The majority offered leave of
three months or less. Additionally, only 37% provided unpaid job pro-
tected leave for men.48 However, only nine companies reported that men
had taken advantage of these leaves.49 This should not be surprising,
however, since 62.8% of the companies reported they did not think it was
appropriate for men to take any type of parental leave.50 Additionally,
only 27.5% offered parental leave when adopting.56
Surprisingly, the majority of firms (86.4%) considered it relatively easy
to arrange leave periods and benefit continuation.5 2 As Jeanne F. Kardos,
"s Id. at 21; Among the more industrialized countries, the average minimum paid leave
is twelve to fourteen weeks with many also providing the right to unpaid, job-protected
leaves for at least one year. Id.
40 Id. at 17.
" The results of the survey were based on 384 responses to a questionnaire sent to
Fortune 1500 companies. BRsrmm PAPER, supra note 18, at 11.
"I Amount of Leave
7.7% offered 1-2 weeks
21% offered 1 month
11.6% offered 2 months
24.3% offered 2 months
28.3% offered 4-6 months
7.2% offered over 6 months
Source: Catalyst Career and Family Center, A 1986 Nationwide Survey of Maternity/
Parental Leaves, BuaEu'mo PAPEs, supra note 18, at 11.
" BmEFwG PAPER, supra note 18, at 11.Go Id. at 11.
s' Id. at 12.
'2 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 19. The survey results indicate that most
companies reroute the work of the employee on leave:
79.8% rerouted managerial work
73.8% rerouted nonmanagerial work
Additionally, many companies used temporaries; For managerial work:
32.1% hired outside temporaries
50.9% used internal temporaries
For nonmanagerial work:
77.5% hired outside temporaries
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Director of Employee Benefits at Southern New England Telephone
explained at the Committee hearings, an increasing number of compa-
nies are realizing the advantage of providing adequate employee benefits.
Ms. Kardos stated:
There are several factors which caused us to develop our benefit
philosophy with regard to maternity and parental care. Along
with many leading companies in the country, we recognize that
women with children are in the workforce to stay.... [T]hey have
special needs involving pregnancy and childrearing. We've also
responded to a heretofore ignored group-fathers who want to be
involved in full time child-rearing at some point after birth or
adoption. The special needs of these parents, and more than that,
the benefits which accrue to them and their children from this
early participation in child-rearing cannot be ignored any more
than the widely accepted need for medical or pension benefits.
In addition, one of the most important concerns we share with
our employees is an interest in their careers. It is clear that
forcing them to choose between the children and their jobs, or to
compromise on either produces at least one loser-maybe two.
Adequate disability and parenting leave can solve these prob-
lems. The employee returns to the company when he or she is
prepared to do so, and the company retains an important asset.53
While the findings of the Catalyst survey are encouraging, they can be
misleading. As stated, Catalyst surveyed only Fortune 1500 companies.5 4
Traditionally, large companies have offered more comprehensive em-
ployee benefits. 55 Thus, the Catalyst survey results may tend to overstate
the availability of parenting leave.
In 1981, a survey of small and medium sized firms was conducted by
the Columbia University School of Social Work. 56 The results of the
survey indicate that less than 40% of working women received paid
disability leave for the period of recovery after childbirth; 88% of the
firms provided some type of maternity leave, but only 72% of those
guaranteed the employee's job and allowed retention of seniority. Thirty-
three percent (33%) provided less than two months leave which is merely
enough time to physically recover after childbirth. Further, only 25% of
63.9% used internal temporaries
The survey revealed that work force size had little effect on which method a company used.
Source: Catalyst Career and Family Center, A 1986 Nationwide Survey of Maternity/
Parental Leaves, BPmrNa PAPER, supra note 18, at 12.
5 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 19-20.
Supra note 47 and accompanying text.
s See BRmNc PAPE, supra note 18, at 6-7.
56 Id. at 12. The results of this survey were based on 250 responses to a questionnaire
sent to a random sample of 1000 small and medium sized firms.
(Vol. 35:455
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss3/7
1987] FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1986 463
those responding permitted men to take parental leave. Additionally, of
the firms which allowed men leave, many only permitted the employee to
take a few days off at the time of childbirth.67
These two studies indicate that there is a large variation among
employers as to the parental leave they provide. The variations exist not
only between firms of different size, but also between firms of the same
size. However, the larger the firm, the more adequate the benefits
including parental leave, and, the higher the wages. 58 Most women, as
well as the large percentage of all workers, however, are employed by
small firms.59 More than two-fifths of all employees work for businesses
with less than 100 people, and 33.3% (close to 18 million workers) are
employed by firms with less than 25 employees. 60 In short, statistics
indicate that almost one-third of all American workers are employed by
businesses with less than 25 employees.61 And yet, it is these small
businesses which have been proven to be the least likely to provide not
only parental leave, but also sick leave, disability leave, health insurance
and pension plans.62
The demographic changes and current employment policies outlined
above present a strong case for the passage of H.R. 4300. However, in
order to fully understand the need for H.R. 4300 it is also necessary to
have an understanding of the current state of the law as it relates to
pregnancy in the workforce for it is these factors combined which clearly
indicate a change is needed.
III. PoGREwSSoN AND CumRur STATE OF THE LAW
A. Federal Law
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act63 was passed in 1978 as an
amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.64 Congress'
purpose in enacting the PDA was to legislatively overrule the Su-
preme Court's decisions in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert65 and Nash-
ville Gas Co. v. Satty6 6 and to make clear that Title VIrs prohibition
6'7 Committee Report, supra note 2, at 20; For a more detailed breakdown of these
statistics see BRIENG PAPER, supra note 18, at 13.
"8 See BRrnNG PAPER, supra note 18, at 6-7.
69 Id. at 5-6.
60 Id. at 5.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 5-6.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)(1982)[hereinafter PDA].
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 20000e-2000e-17 (1982).
65 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
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against sex discrimination included discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy.67
In Gilbert, the Court per Justice Rehnquist, held that General Electric
Co. had not violated Title VII when it failed to include pregnancy in its
otherwise all inclusive disability plan. The Court reasoned that the
denial of pregnancy benefits did not constitute sex discrimination be-
cause the benefit plan distinguished between pregnant and nonpregnant
persons rather than between men and women.6 8
In reaching its decision, the Court entirely disregarded the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commissions Guidelines, as well as the deci-
sions of eighteen federal district courts and all seven federal courts of
appeals which had considered the issue.69
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,70 which was decided one year later, held
that Nashville Gas's policy regarding accumulated seniority violated
Title VII. It was Nashville Gas's policy to deny accumulated seniority to
employees returning from maternity leave while allowing employees
returning from other nonoccupational leaves to retain their accumulated
seniority.71 The court distinguished Satty from Gilbert on the ground that
in Satty:
[The] petitioner ha[d] not merely refused to extend to women a
benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but ha[d] imposed on
women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The
67 H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & ADMIN.
NEWS 4749-4751 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 95-948].
o The Court based its decision in Gilbert on its decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484 (1974), which held that a similar benefit plan did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. It was in Geduldig's famous footnote 20 that the Court first
divided the world into pregnant and nonpregnant persons. Geduldig at 496 n.20. The Gilbert
Court stated that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy may be actionable if the plaintiff
can prove the exclusion of pregnancy is merely a pretext for sex discrimination. In Gilbert,
the Court found no such pretext. However, it is interesting to note, as Justice Brennan
points out in his dissent, that when determining the issue of pretext the majority entirely
disregarded General Electric's history of sex discrimination which, according to Brennan,
had served to undercut women's opportunities in the past. Gilbert at 149. Justice Brennan
contends that General Electric had a history of discriminating against women with regard
to benefits which dated back to 1926 when General Electric's employee manual stated that
no benefits were given to women because "women did not recognize the responsibilities of
life, for they probably were hoping to get married soon and leave the company." Gilbert at
149-50 n.1.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens took issue with the Court's logic in determining
that the benefit plan distinguished between pregnant and nonpregnant persons. "Insurance
programs, company policies, and employment contracts all deal with future risks rather
than historical facts. The classification is between persons who face a risk of pregnancy and
those who do not." Gilbert at 161 n.5 (emphasis in original).
6 H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 67 at 4750.
70 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
71 Id. at 138, 140.
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distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of
semantics. 72
Unfortunately, the court never made clear what the basis for this
distinction was, if not semantics. 73
Displeased with the Court's decisions in Gilbert and Satty, Congress
passed the PDA to make it clear that Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination was intended to include discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy.74 In so doing Congress explicitly adopted the dissenting
Justices' interpretation of Title VII.75
The terms because of sex or on the basis of sex include, but are not
limited to because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical condition; and women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical condition shall be treated the same
for all employment related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.
76
While the language of the PDA appears clear, its proper interpretation
has been the subject of great debate both among the courts and among
feminists. 77 An in depth analysis of this debate is not within the scope of
this discussion. However, a basic understanding of the issues involved
will aid in understanding the development of the law in this area and
H.R. 4300's place in this development.
The issue at the heart of the debate is whether the PDA requires
employers to treat pregnancy exactly the same as any other disability
and thus precludes any employment policy which provides special bene-
fits for pregnant workers; or whether an employer may provide special
72 Id. at 142.
73 At first blush, the Court's analysis appears to be logical as the disability insurance at
issue in Gilbert is commonly referred to as a benefit. However, upon further examination it
becomes clear that the Court could have characterized Nashville Gas' policy as a benefit as
well. The Court could have stated that by allowing certain employees to retain their
seniority, Nashville Gas was doing no more than conferring a benefit on certain employees.
However, in Satty the employment policy was a bit more dubious and thus, the Court needed
to distinguish it from Gilbert lest it appear to be condoning this type of discrimination.
74 See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, supra note 67.
76 Id. at 4750.
76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
7 See, e.g., Kay, Models of Equity, 1985 U. ILL. L. Radv. 39 (discussing the positive action
versus equal treatment approach to sex discrimination as compared to race discrimination);
Krieger and Cooney, The Miller.Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and
the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GoLErN GATE U. L. REv. 513 (1983)(discussing the
proper interpretation of the PDA as it applies to the issue of federal preemption); Note,
Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 690 (1983)(dis-
cussing the proper interpretation of the PDA). See also Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope:
Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work, in DousLE ExPosuE: WosEN's HmTH HAZARS ON THE JOB
AND AT HoE (V. Chavkin ed. 1984)(discussing feminist reaction to the passage of the PDA).
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benefits for pregnant workers based on the fact that men do not suffer any
analogous disability.78 Andrew Weissman, in his Note entitled Sexual
Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,79 contends that the
language of the act can support either interpretation. According to
Weissman, it can be argued that the second clause, which states that
"women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes . . ."80 is the substantive clause of the
Act,81 while the first clause, which states that "[tihe terms because of sex
or on the basis of sex include but are not limited to because of or on the
basis of pregnancy . ... "82 is merely definitional.83 Alternatively,
Weissman contends that when the first clause is read in conjunction with
Congress' specific purpose in enacting the PDA,84 it can be argued that
the first clause was intended as a complete bar against any discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy regardless of how men are treated.85
At the time the PDA was passed, many feminists were afraid that if
they emphasized the special needs of pregnant women it would endanger
the gains which had been achieved thus far and discourage employers
from hiring women.8 6 This fear was particularly strong because tradi-
tionally the female reproductive role had been used to suppress women
and keep them out of the work force and public life.8 7 Thus, these
feminists lobbied for what one commentator has termed the "medical
model."88 The medical model is premised on the belief that pregnancy is
78 See California Savings and Loan v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683 (1987); Miller-Wohl Co.
v. Com'r of Labor and Industry, 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984). The issue of the proper means
to achieve sexual equity in the workplace has also been the subject of a number of
thoughtful articles and essays. See supra note 77.
79 83 CoLubi. L. Rsv. 690 (1983).
o 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
81 Note, supra note 79, at 694-95.
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
a Note, supra note 79, at 695.
8 Id. at 695-96.
85 Note, supra note 79, at 694-96.
86 Chavkin, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting, and Work in DourLs ExposuRz:
WOmeN's HEALTH HAZARDS ON THE Joa AND AT HOmE, 202 (W. Chavkin, ed. 1984). Interestingly,
this same argument is currently being raised by those who oppose H.R. 4300. See infra note
179 and accompanying text.
87 Id. at 202.
88 In her article Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work, supra note 86,
Chavkin identifies this interpretation of the PDA as the medical model. This same
interpretation has also been termed the "assimilationist view" (as in Kay, supra note 77 and
Note, supra note 79), as well as the "equality model" (as in Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 VoiEN's RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982)). I
prefer to use Chavkin's medical model to describe this interpretation as I believe this term
best describes the basis of the view, i.e., that pregnancy is nothing more than a temporary
physical disability indistinguishable from any other temporary physical disability. The
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no different than any other temporary disability and thus employers are
required to do no more than treat pregnancy as they do any other
disability.89 This means that if an employer provides no disability leave
to men, it is not a violation of the PDA to provide no leave for pregnant
workers, even though 85% of working women are likely to become
pregnant during their working lives. 90 It is this interpretation of the PDA
which has been adopted by the EEOC and is reflected in the EEOC
guidelines. 91 Additionally, a number of courts have adopted this inter-
pretation.9 2
While deficient in many respects, the medical model does prevent
employers from treating pregnant employees less favorably than other
temporarily disabled workers. 93 However, the medical model is a double
term itself shows the emphasis on the physical act of childbirth and the deemphasis on the
emotional and psychological ramifications of parenting.
89 See Chavkin, supra note 86.
1o 9 to 5 National Association of Working Women, Fact Sheet on Parental Leave
(available from 9 to 5 National Association of Working Women, National Headquarters,
Cleveland, Ohio).
"' Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex 29 C.F.RY § 1604.10 (1986) which
provides in pertinent part:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions, for all job-related purposes, shall be treated the same as
disabilities caused or contributed to by other medical conditions... Written or
unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the
commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual
of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement .. shall be applied
to disability due to pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condition on the same
terms and conditions as they are applied to other disabilities.
See also, Questions and Answers on the Pregnancy Discrimination, Act 29 C.F.R. at 136.
92 See Clanton v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 649 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981); In Re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Maternity Benefits Litig., 602 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979);
Pennington v. Lexington School Dist., 578 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1978).
93 In Clanton, 649 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit held that the school board
had violated Title VII by allowing the superintendent to determine when a teacher could
return from maternity leave, while granting him no concomitant discretion with respect to
teachers returning from sick leave. Similarly, in In Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.
Maternity Benefits Litig., 602 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979), the Eighth Circuit found South-
western Bells reemployment policy to be violative of Title VIL The reemployment policy
stated that an employee returning from a disability leave, i.e. leave for nonoccupational
illness or injury other than pregnancy, was guaranteed reemployment while employees
returning from leaves of absence, including maternity were not guaranteed reemployment.
The court reasoned that although the policy was neutral on its face, in that it treated males
and females returning from disability leave equally, it was discriminatory in effect because
it failed to recognize pregnancy as a disability. Southwestern Bell at 849. Another example
of this type of analysis can be found in Pennington v. Lexington School Dist., 578 F.2d 546
(4th Cir. 1978), in which the court held the school's policy of denying employment for the
remainder of the year to teachers taking maternity leave, while allowing teachers who had
taken sick leave to return for the remainder of the year was a violation of Title VII.
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edged sword. Under the medical model's "comparison analysis" pregnant
workers are not entitled to disability leave or any other employment
benefit unless it can be demonstrated that a similarly situated employee
who is temporarily disabled by reason other than pregnancy is being
treated more favorably. Taken to its extreme, this "comparison analysis"
can produce absurd results as in James v. Delta Airlines.94 In James,
female flight attendants brought suit against Delta alleging that they
had been the victims of sexual discrimination which resulted in the loss
of seniority. Pursuant to Delta's policy, the female flight attendants took
a mandatory maternity leave of absence.9 5 During that time it was
Delta's policy to allow seniority for bidding and pay purposes to accrue
only for the first three months of leave. The flight attendants' mandatory
leave was in excess of three months. Thus, every flight attendant lost
seniority as a result of her mandatory leave. The court held that the
plaintiffs could not have been the victims of sexual discrimination
because Delta employed no male flight attendants at the time.
94 571 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978).
" Whether an employer can force a pregnant employee to take a mandatory maternity
leave commencing on a specific date is a frequently litigated issue, particularly in teaching
and in the airline industry. The only Supreme Court case to address this issue is Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur, the Court held the Board's policy
of requiring pregnant teachers to take leave without pay at least five months prior to their
delivery date violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court stated
that such a policy constituted an irrebuttable presumption that pregnant teachers were
physically unable to teach, even when medical evidence indicated that the teacher was in
fact physically capable. Id. at 644-46. Further, the court held that while the school board
may have an interest in the administrative ease which a uniform termination date would
provide, this interest was insufficient to justify the policy and the school board must adopt
alternative administrative policies. Id. at 647.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of whether mandatory maternity
leaves violates Title VII. As a result, the judiciary is split on the issue. However, an
overview of the case law indicates that, generally, when the employer can prove that the
mandatory leave is justified either as a BFOQ (see 42 U.S.C. 2000(e)-2(e)(1982)) or on the
basis of business necessity, (see infra note 119), the court will uphold the policy. See, e.g.,
Levin v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984)(Delta's policy of grounding all
flight attendants upon discovery of pregnancy justified on grounds of business necessity as
policy was related to airline's safety concerns); Condit v. United Air Lines Inc., 358 F.2d
1176 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978)(United's policy of grounding flight
attendants upon discovery of pregnancy justified as evidence showed pregnancy could
incapacitate flight attendants in way that might threaten safe operation of aircraft and
therefore pregnancy was a bona fide occupational qualification, (BFOQ)), but see Burwell v.
Eastern Airlines, 458 F. Supp. 474 (1978), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 633
F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981)(Eastern's policy of grounding
flight attendants upon discovery of pregnancy violated Title VII because Eastern did not
have compelling business interest in the health of its employees or its employees' unborn
children, and whether a woman should cease work is a decision for the employee and her
physician); Stansell v. Sherwin-Williams Company, 404 F. Supp. 696 (1975)(requirement
that employee take maternity leave before date suggested by her physician violates Title
VI).
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Additionally, the medical model is entirely unable to deal with the
issues of prenatal cares6 and breastfeeding. Board of School Directors v.
Rossetti9 7 is an excellent example of the medical model's inability to deal
with breastfeeding. Cheryl Rossetti, a fifth grade teacher, was granted a
maternity leave prior to the birth of her child. Upon expiration of her
maternity leave, plaintiff requested a leave of absence in order to
continue breastfeeding her child. She requested the leave based upon her
physician's opinion that, due to a history of allergy problems, it would be
in the best interest of the baby if plaintiff would continue to breastfeed.
The school board denied her request. On appeal, the Secretary of
Education and the lower court both found in her favor.98 In its opinion,
the lower court stated:
[Slince the development of the law in this area has been based
upon the unique position of the female confronted with the
prospect of childbirth, it follows that the request for additional
leave for breastfeeding purposes under the circumstances of this
case is merely a logical and natural extension of that concept.
Consequently, the refusal of the Board to grant respondent's
request for an unpaid leave of absence . . . amounted to an
unlawful discriminatory practice. 99
However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania'00 reversed on the ground
that plaintiff had been treated no differently than any male teacher
would have been treated, had he requested leave to care for an ill
newborn.' 0 ' The problem with this logic is clear. As the dissent points
out, the majority's position "ignores the obvious reality that only women
can perform the breastfeeding function." 10 2 Despite the majority's view,
Mrs. Rossetti was not in the same situation as any male teacher
" Chavkin, supra note 86, contends that the medical model is unable to deal with
prenatal care because prenatal care is preventative rather than curative and therefore does
not fit neatly into the disability model. Id. at 203. As a result, many women are unable to
receive proper prenatal care which is of utmost importance to the health of the baby and
the mother. Id. Chavkin relates the difficulties a surgical intern had regarding prenatal
care:
I had difficulty getting to appointments with my obstetrician. When I was in my
ninth month I travelled uptown to the doctor after being on call all night and then
was chewed out for not returning to the hospital ... after the appointment. I was
supposed to see the doctor once a week in my last month, but I didn't go, 'cause I
couldn't leave. I couldn't go to childbirth classes either.
Id. at 203-04.
97 488 Pa. 125, 411 A.2d 486 (1979).
98 36 Pa. Commw. 105, 387 A.2d 957 (1978).
9 Id. at 112-13, 387 A.2d at 960.
1o 488 Pa. 125, 411 A.2d 486 (1979).
101 Id. at 131, 411 A.2d at 489.
102 Id. at 133, 411 A.2d at 489.
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requesting leave to stay home with an ill child. It is possible for a parent
with an ill child to have someone else care for the child. However, only
one person can breastfeed the child.103
The above discussion clearly illustrates the inherent deficiencies of the
medical model. The underlying premise of the medical model is that
equity in the workforce can be achieved by treating men and women
exactly alike. While this premise may be valid when applied to race
discrimination,104 it simply is not valid when applied to an analysis of
pregnancy discrimination. Simply put, men and women are not the same.
Each has a different reproductive role. When addressing issues involving
the relationship between employment and reproduction, it is entirely
unrealistic to argue that by ignoring the unique role of each sex we can
attain equity.
While many courts subscribe to the medical model, some courts have
adopted what has been termed by some commentators as the "pluralist
view."'1 5 Unlike the medical model, the pluralist view recognizes and
accepts the different reproductive roles of men and women and seeks
equity through policies which reflect this reality. 08 Thus, under the
pluralist view, equal treatment is not necessarily equitable treatment
and employers may be held to be in violation of the PDA even though
their employment policies treat men and women exactly the same. The
103 In her article Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work, supra note 86,
Chavkin discusses the problems faced by women who choose to breastfeed:
The medical model is completely at a loss when faced with the issue of breastfeed-
ing. The breastfeeding worker is neither ill nor temporarily disabled. She is a
fully capable worker who merely requires facilities at work to enable her to pump
her breasts and refrigerate the milk until she takes it home for the baby. If she is
denied the opportunity to pump her breasts, they may become engorged and her
milk supply may drop.
Id. at 205.
Chavkin contends that the hostility toward working mothers can be seen in employers'
refusals to accommodate the needs of breastfeeding employees at work. One employer
stated, 'To allow a nursing mother to work would foist upon the company a burden to bear
the resulting inefficiencies of lost product from time spent away from her job." Id. Chavkin
does report that in that particular case, the union grieved and won, and that the policy was
changed. Unfortunately, many women are not covered by union contracts. See infra note
170.
104 For an excellent discussion of why the medical model or assimilationist view may be
applicable to race discrimination, but not sex discrimination, see Kay, supra note 77.
los Andrew Weissman's Note, entitled Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act utilizes the term "pluralist view". See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
However, this same view has also been termed the "positive action approach" (see Krieger
& Cooney, supra note 77), and the "equal opportunity model," (see Kay, supra note 77 at
n.11., p. 40).
'0' See generally Kay, supra note 77; Krieger and Cooney, supra note 77; and Note, supra
note 79.
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adoption of the pluralist view has resulted in thoughtful and equitable
decisions by the courts which have utilized it.
Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union,107 is an excellent
example of the pluralist view. Abraham was employed by the union as a
temporary full time employee. Pursuant to a contract between the union
and the Department of Labor, persons in this position were entitled to ten
days sick leave and ten days vacation time. Approximately one year after
Abraham began working for the union she became pregnant. Eventually
Abraham lost her job and filed suit alleging that she was unlawfully
discharged because of her pregnancy. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held, inter alia, that the Union's ten day leave policy
violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on women.'0 8
The court stated that while a ten day leave is sufficient for a number of
temporary disabilities, it is obviously too short to accommodate disability
caused by pregnancy. "Oncoming motherhood was virtually tantamount
to dismissal, though other dispositions might well and usually would pose
no threat to continued employment. In short, the ten day absolute ceiling
on disability leave portended a drastic effect on women employees of
childbearing age-an impact no male would ever encounter."10 9 The court
further stated that an employer could violate Title VII by offering
inadequate leave to the same extent as applying adequate leave in a
discriminatory manner. Thus, the Abraham court refused to uphold the
employment policy simply because it was applied equally to men and
women.
This reasoning is not only more consistent with Title VII and the PDA,
but also much more realistic in its approach to achieving equity between
the sexes. Had the court applied the medical model in Abraham, it would
have had to find the ten day leave policy legal, thus 'permit[tingl an
employer to burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of
employment opportunities because of their different [reproductive]
role."110 Surely such a result could not have been intended by Congress,
the EEOC, or anyone who originally supported the medical model.
B. State Law
While cases like Abraham"' are encouraging to those in favor of a
more enlightened approach to the problem of pregnancy in the workplace,
most of the real progress has been made at the state level. Presently,
107 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
LOS Disparate impact is a term of art under Title VII. It refers to an analysis used to
invalidate facially neutral employment policies where the policy's result is to dispropor-
tionately burden a protected class.
109 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11 Id. at 818 (quoting Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. at 142 (1977).
... 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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there are at least eight states112 which have passed legislation which
requires employers to provide a reasonable maternity leave period and to
guarantee reinstatement upon expiration of the leave. These statutes are
quite similar. However, there are some variances between the states
which are noteworthy.
Only two states, California and Massachusetts, set a ceiling on the
amount of time which may be taken. 113 The other statutes provide that an
employee is entitled to a reasonable leave.114 A reasonable leave is
usually defined as that period of time during which the employee is
physically disabled due to pregnancy, childbirth, or related condition.115
Some statutes specifically state that a leave of absence for child rearing
is not required.l11 However, Massachusetts has taken the opposite
approach by requiring an employer to grant a leave of absence with
guaranteed reinstatement to a female employee, even if adopting a
child.117 While this provision is certainly progressive, it is unclear why
this benefit was not extended to men, as the leave is no longer predicated
upon pregnancy.118 Additionally, the majority of the states provide a
statutory defense for failure to reinstate.119
I" California, CAL. GOV'T Cone § 12945(b)(2)(West 1980); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46a-60 (1985); Hawaii, Hawaii Fair Employment Practice Laws § 12-23-58, reprinted in
[8A Fair Empl. Prac. Man.] LA. REIL RP. (BNA) 453:2328-2329 (1983); Illinois, Illinois
Fair Empl. Prac. Comm. Guidelines § 2.10, reprinted in [8A Fair Emp. Prac. Man.] LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA) 453:2753 (1977); Massachusetts, MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149 § 105D (West
1982); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-2602 (1985); New Hampshire, Fair Employment
Practice Laws HUM 402.03, reprinted in [SA Fair Empl. Prac. Man.] LAB. REL REP. (BNA)
455:2464 (1983); Washington, Fair Employment Practice Laws, reprinted in [8 A Fair Empl.
Prac. Man.] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 457:2951 (1977).
113 The California Law entitles a woman to a reasonable leave of absence not to exceed
four months, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2)(West 1980); while the Massachusetts statute
provides for a maximum leave of eight weeks, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 105D (West
1982).
114 See Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, Washington, supra note
112.
115 See, e.g., California, Hawaii, Washington, supra note 112.
"'e See, e.g., Hawaii, Illinois, id.
117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 105D (West 1982).
"' Undoubtedly, the legislature for all its "progressive" ideas is still somewhat tradi-
tional.
119 See Connecticut, Illinois, Montana, New Hampshire, Washington, supra note 112.
The defense most frequently allowed is "business necessity" or a variation thereof.
"Business necessity" is a term of art which refers to a nonstatutory defense to an
allegation of disparate impact. The courts have interpreted the business necessity defense
very narrowly. Generally, a claim of business necessity will only be successful if the
defendant can prove the challenged practice is necessary for the safe operation of the
business or is somehow related to the essence of the business operation. As was stated in
Diazv. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971), "we apply a business necessity test, not a business convenience test . . . [D]is-
crimination ... is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be under-
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The major issues regarding state legislation has been whether it is
preempted by the PDA and/or whether it violates the equal protection
clause. The first case to address these issues was Miller-Wohl Company v.
Commissioner of Labor and Industry.120 Plaintiff, Miller-Wohl brought
suit alleging that the Montana Maternity Leave Actll violated the equal
protection clause and that it was preempted by the PDA. The district
court 122 held, inter alia, that the MMLA did not violate the equal
protection clause, nor was it preempted by the PDA. The court stated that
the equal protection clause is not violated when pregnancy is given
preferential treatment. Rather, by removing pregnancy as a grounds for
dismissal the MMLA places men and women on more equal terms.123
The Supreme Court of Montana 124 concurred with the district court's
mined. . . "442 F.2d at 388 (emphasis in the original). Cost alone is not a defense to a Title
VII action and does not constitute business necessity. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Lake Oswego,
519 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1975) (costs which may be defense to equal protection claim would not
necessarily be defense for Title VII purposes); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199
(3d Cir. 1975)(absent showing that increase in premium due to inclusion of pregnancy
benefits would be "devastating", cost is no defense); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of
Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (D. Iowa 1975)(employer must accept any increase in cost as merely
a cost of production).
It is unclear what standard the state courts would use to determine whether failure to
reemploy a woman returning from maternity leave is justified as business necessity. Given
the narrow interpretation of the business necessity test under Title VII it seems clear that
if the courts use a Title VII analysis an employer will have to show more than the
inconvenience or cost of holding a job open.
120 696 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984).
121 MONT. CooE ANN. §41-2602 (1985)[hereinafter MMLA]. The MMIA provides in
pertinent part that:
1) It shall be unlawful for an employer or his agent:
(b) to refuse to grant to the employee a reasonable leave of absence
for... pregnancy
2) Upon signifying her intent to return at the end of her leave of absence, such
employee shall be reinstated to her original job or to an equivalent position with
equivalent pay and accumulated seniority, retirement, fringe benefits, and other
service credits...
122 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981).
123 Id. at 1266. Ironically, in response to Miller-Wohl's assertion that the MMLA creates
a sex based classification by singling out pregnancy, the court cites Geduldig's famous
footnote 20 (Geduldig v. Aiello, 496 U.S. 484, 496 n.20, supra note 68) for the proposition
that a classification based on pregnancy is not necessarily a sex based classification. Is this
evidence of the adage "what goes around comes around'?!
124 692 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984). Miller-Wohl has an interesting procedural history which
resulted in the case being adjudicated by the Montana Supreme Court after having been
originally filed in the United States District Court for Montana. On October 3, 1980, the
Montana Commission on Labor and Industry found that Miller-Wohl had violated the
MMLA. Miller-Wohl appealed the finding to the United States District Court for Montana
which concurred with the Commissioner's findings. 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont. 1981).
Miller-Wohl then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
which dismissed the action stating that Miller-Wohl's claims were in substance defenses to
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decision regarding the equal protection clause and expanded on the issue
of whether the MMLA was preempted by the PDA. The supreme court
stated that the legislative history of the PDA clearly indicates Congress'
intent to permit state action consistent with the PDA.125 Additionally,
the court found the MMLA's affirmative protection to be entirely consis-
tent with the purpose of the PDA.126 The court's reasoning was simple
and logical. The purpose of the PDA is to ensure that men and women are
treated equally with regard to employment. When a woman is discharged
solely on the basis of pregnancy she is not being treated equitably
because a man can never be discharged for that reason. Further, the court
commented that if there were any doubt as to whether the PDA
preempted the MMLA, the way to resolve that doubt would be to extend
the protection of the MMLA to all temporarily disabled employees. 127
Additionally, as did the court in Abraham,1 2s the Montana court found
Miller-Woh's "no leave" policy to be in violation of the PDA. The court
held that while Miller-Wohl's policy was facially neutral, it had a
disparate impact on women and therefore violated Title VII.
The issues of federal preemption as well as the proper interpretation of
the PDA were finally decided by the United States Supreme Court in
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra.129 Like
Miller-Wohl,13 0 California Federal was brought by an employer seeking a
declaration that California Government Code section 12945(b)(2)1s1 was
preempted by the Title VII as amended by the PDA. However, unlike
Miller-Wohl, California Federal did not decide the issue of equal protec-
tion. The case arose as follows.
Lillian Garland was employed as a receptionist by California Federal
the employee's state claims and therefore, Miller-Wohl failed to present an affirmative
federal claim over which the court could assert jurisdiction. 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
This dismissal left the district court decision without precedential effect. 692 P.2d at 1243.
At this point, Miller-Wohl petitioned the state court for review of the Commissioner's
findings. The state court reversed the decision of the Commissioner and held that the
MMLA is discriminatory, violates the equal protection clause and is preempted by Title VII.
692 P.2d at 1246. The case was then appealed through the state court system, and
eventually was decided by the Montana Supreme Court. 692 P.2d 1243.
125 692 P.2d at 1247.
126 Id. at 1254.
127 Id. at 1255.
128 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
129 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
130 602 P.2d 1243 (Mont. 1984).
's' CAuroRNu GOV'T CODE § 129459b)(2)(West 1980) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful employment practices unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification:
(b) For an employer to refuse to allow a female employee affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical condition ...
(2) To take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of time...
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Savings and Loan. In 1982, Garland took a pregnancy disability leave as
provided in California Government Code section 12945(b)(2). Upon
notifying her employer that she was able to return to work, Garland was
told that her job had been filled and that there were no comparable
positions available. Garland filed a complaint with the Department of
Fair Employment and Housing which charged California Federal with
violating section 12945(b)(2). Before any further administrative action
was taken, California Federal instituted suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of California
Federal holding, inter alia, that section 12945(b)(2) discriminated against
men on the basis of pregnancy.'3 2 However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed stating, "the district court's conclusion that section
12945(b)(2) discriminates against men on the basis of pregnancy defies
common sense, misinterprets case law and flouts Title VII and the
PDA."133
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. The
Court reasoned that section 1104 of Title XI of the Civil Rights Act 3 4
clearly indicates that there are only two ways in which section
12945(b)(2) can be preempted. The first is if "compliance with federal and
state legislation [is] a physical impossibility."135 The second is if the
"state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'3 6 In the instant case, the
Court found neither of these two principles had been violated.
The Court stated that Title VII and section 12945(b)(2) share a common
goal. Both seek to achieve equality of employment opportunity by
removing barriers which have operated in the past to the detriment of a
particular group. 137 By requiring reinstatement, the California law
promotes equal employment opportunity. This requirement ensures that
women will not lose their jobs because of pregnancy and allows women as
well as men to have families without having to give up their jobs.138
The Court also specifically addressed the issue of the proper interpre-
tation of the PDA.139 California Federal argued that the second clause of
the PDA made it clear that pregnancy could not be singled out for special
132 [34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases] LAB. REL REP. (BNA) 562 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
133 758 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir. 1984)(footnotes omitted).
134 42 U.S.C. § 2000n-4, 1964. Title XI is applicable to all titles of the Civil Rights Act
and provides in part that "[no] provision of this Act [shall] be construed as invalidating any
provision of state law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of this
Act or any provision thereof."
135 107 S. Ct. at 689 (quoting Florida Lime and Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)).
136 107 S. Ct. at 689 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
137 107 S. Ct. at 693 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
138 California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 694.
139 Justice Scalia, who concurred in the judgment, chastised the majority for interpreting
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treatment. However, the Court rejected this argument reasoning that the
language of the PDA must be interpreted within its historical context and
legislative history. Thus, the Court held, "[r]ather than imposing a
limitation on the remedial purpose of the PDA, we believe that the second
clause was intended to overrule the holding in Gilbert and to illustrate
how discrimination against pregnancy is to be remedied."1 40 The Court
went on to say that, "if Congress had intended to prohibit preferential
treatment, it would have been the height of understatement to say only
that the legislation would not require such conduct."1 4
Finally, the Court stated that even if it agree with California Federal's
construction of the PDA, it did not follow that California Federal was
prevented from complying with both the California Law and the PDA. In
the Courts opinion, the California statute merely establishes a benefit
which at the minimum must be provided. It does not, however, prevent
California Federal from providing the same benefit to all employees. 42
The California Federal decision is important for a number of reasons.
First, it puts to rest the long debated issue of the proper interpretations
of the PDA. 43 By adopting the pluralist interpretation rather than the
medical model, the Court makes it clear that pregnant employees are not
treated equitably when they are treated the same as men. The Court
recognizes that the purpose of the PDA is to provide equal employment
opportunity and that, to ensure such opportunity, employers must be
required to provide special accommodations for women as they face a
burden which men do not share.
This decision is also a recognition of the difficulties and discrimination
women have faced trying to fulfill their dual role in society. It goes even
further, in that it is a recognition that each half of this dual role is
important to society and women should not be forced to sacrifice one for
the other.
While California Federal is certainly a victory for those who believe in
both equal employment opportunity and guaranteed reinstatement, it
should not be viewed as the end. It is merely a stepping stone toward job
protected parental leave for all employees regardless of their sex. In
California Federal, the Court made it clear that the purpose of the PDA
is not merely to prevent discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, but to
the PDA. He believed that was not the issue before the Court. Justice Scalia stated, "I am
fully aware that it is more convenient for the employers of California and the California
Legislature to have us interpret the PDA prematurely. It has never been suggested,
however, that the constitutional prohibition upon our rendering advisory opinions is
doctrine of convenience." California Federal, 107 S. Ct. at 698.
140 Id. at 691.
141 Id. at 692 (emphasis in original).
142 Id. at 694-95.
143 See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the various interpretations of
the PDA).
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allow a woman to become a parent without risking her job. "The entire
thrust ... behind [the PDA] is to guarantee women the basic right to
participate fully and equally in the workforce without denying them the
fundamental right to full participation in family life."'144 H.R. 4300
finally extends this right to men as well as women and thus is the logical
next step in the evolution of employment law.
Once it is conceded that the purpose of these laws is to allow an
individual to earn a living and at the same time have a family, then there
is no reason to apply the law to women only. The time has come to cease
viewing the problem of balancing work and family as a women's issue.
We must start understanding that infant care and child care is an issue
which effects every member of society. Traditional sex roles are inappli-
cable to modern American society and, regardless of whether one believes
this is desirable, the statistics prove the days of "Ozzie and Harriet" are
gone. 145 Thus, family leave laws which apply to women only are simply
antiquated and inadequate.
The development of the law in this area reveals a logical progression of
thought. Beginning with Title VII and continuing through California
Federal, the law has developed, albeit slowly, to meet the changing needs
of society. While the law has progressed significantly in the past 23 years,
the development will not be complete until the right to family leave is
recognized as a right in and of itself and is no longer tied to laws
prohibiting sex discrimination.
H.R. 4300 will complete this development by entitling all employees,
regardless of sex, to family leave. Unlike all previous legislation which
has addressed this issue, H.R. 4300 seeks a solution not by prohibiting
discrimination against women, but by conferring a benefit to all employ-
ees. In so doing, H.R. 4300 eradicates the problems with the medical
model and provides for truly equitable treatment.
IV. OVERVIEW OF H.R. 4300
The provisions of H.R. 4300 apply to employers with 15 or more
employees. 146 For the purposes of this bill, an employer is deemed to
144 107 S.Ct at 694 (quoting 123 CoNG. REc. 29658 (1977)).
141 See text, supra § hA. Demographic Changes in Society..
146 H.R. 4300 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 [hereinafter H.R. 4300]. Originally the bill was
applicable to all employers with 5 or more employees. However, the Committee on Labor
and Education [hereinafter the Committee] raised the small employer exemption to 15, the
same number of employees needed to be covered by Title VU. By raising the small employer
exemption, the Committee excluded more than one-fifth of the private sector workforce. The
Committee viewed this as a "substantial concession" to the needs of small businesses.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1986: Hearing on HIR. 4300 Before the Committee on
Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-699 Part 2 26 (1986)[hereinafter Committee
Report].
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employ 15 or more persons if the combined number of employees within
a two hundred mile radius of any facility of the employer is 15 or more.
147
Section 103 of the bill provides that an employee is entitled to up to
eighteen work weeks of family leave within a 24 month period.148 Family
leave may be taken for the birth of a child, placement of a child, adoption
of a child, or serious illness of a dependent child or parent. 149 The provi-
sions of section 103 are not found in any other legislation which addresses
maternity leave. This is because H.R. 4300 is the first legislation which
addresses the needs of the family as a whole and does not merely single
out pregnancy as the only time when an employee may require a leave of
absence to attend to a family matter.1 0 Further, H.R. 4300 is the first
legislation which entitled men as well as women to family leave.
The leave which is mandated is unpaid. However, nothing in the bill is
intended to prevent an employer from granting paid leave.151 Addition-
ally, any paid vacation leave, personal leave, or family leave may be
substituted for the family leave provided in the bill at the election of the
employer or employee. 152
An important provision of H.R. 4300 is the provision for reduced
leave.153 The reduced leave option allows an employee to take his or her
leave on a reduced basis over a period not to exceed 36 consecutive work
weeks.154 Any employee who chooses to exercise this option must sched-
ule the leave so as not to "disrupt unduly the operations of the em-
ployer."15 5 An employee who wishes to take a reduced leave must adhere
to a regular schedule arranged in advance. 56
The reduced leave option is important for several reasons. Many
families cannot afford to forego the sole income, or even one income for 18
weeks. Without the provision for reduced leave, many people would be
unable to take advantage of the benefits provided by H.R. 4300. It is
14" H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 102. This geographic limitation was also added by the
Committee in an effort to accommodate small business. Committee Report, supra note 146
at 26.
148 H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 103.
149 Id. If the leave is taken for the birth or placement of a child, the leave must be taken
within 12 months of the birth or placement. This provision was also added by the Committee
to accommodate business. Committee Report, supra note 146, at 26.
150 There is however, one limited exception to this. A Massachusetts statute entitles an
employee to take a leave of absence if the employee adopts a child under the age of 3.
However, this provision is applicable to women only. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149
§ 105D (West 1982). See also text, supra § IllB State Laws.
151 H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 103.
152 Id.
153 Id.
I"4 Id. Thus, an employee may choose to work a half day five days a week or perhaps
three full days out of a five day workweek.
155 Id.
'", Committee Report, supra note 146 at 28-29.
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hoped that by providing reduced leave more people will be able to take
family leave when needed.15 7 Additionally, an employee may not always
need 18 consecutive weeks. For example, an employee whose child has
cancer may only need time off when the child undergoes treatment.
Finally, reduced leave can benefit the employer by allowing him to retain
experienced workers rather than hiring temporaries. 15
Perhaps the most important provision of H.R. 4300 is section 107 which
provides for employment and benefits protection. 159 This provision pro-
vides that upon termination of leave, the employee is entitled to be
reinstated to his previous position or an equivalent position with equiv-
alent pay, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment.16o
Additionally, section 107 provides that during an employee's leave of
absence the employer must continue to provide any health insurance
which was provided by the employer prior to the leave. 161 Similarly, an
employee may not be deprived of any benefits which have accrued prior
to leave.16 2 However, an employee is not entitled to accrue any additional
benefits while on leave.163
Finally, H.R. 4300 mandates the establishment of a bipartisan com-
mission to examine the possibility of wage replacement during leave.16 4
V. Aoimixmrs AGAniST H.R. 4300
As with any legislation of this magnitude, its passage faces strong
opposition.1 6 5 Not surprisingly, two major opponents of H.R. 4300 are the
1 7 Id. at 29.
158 Id.
1I HR. 4300, supra note 146, § 107.
10 Id. In its report, the Committee on Education and Labor makes it clear that the
standard to be used is equivalency and not comparability or similarity. The Committee
stressed the use of equivalency standard because it fears that individuals will be deterred
from taking leave if they are not assured of a truly equivalent position. Further, the
Committee states that the standard for determining equivalency shall be the same standard
used for determining discrimination under Title VII. Committee Report, supra note 146, at
33.
161 In her article Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work, supra note 86,
Chavkin reports that a survey conducted by a midwife in a New Haven Connecticut hospital
revealed that many women continued to work longer during pregnancy if their job provided
health insurance. Id. at 203. Section 107 will help ensure that women do not work longer
than is advisable during pregnancy solely to continue health insurance.
162 H.R. 4300, supra note 146 § 107.
163 Id.
164 H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 301.
165 A list of organizations which oppose H.R. 4300 is available from the United States
Chamber of Commerce [hereinafter the Chamber of Commerce] Washington. D.C. This list
includes such members as General Motors Corp., Georgia-Pacific, HewlettPackard, Mar-
riott Corporation and Rockwell International and totals nearly 70 organizations.
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United States Chamber of Commerce' 66 and the National Federation of
Independent Business. 167 These opponents raise four basic arguments in
support of their position. 168
First, it is argued that employee benefits should be the subject of ne-
gotiations between individual employees and employers or between labor
and management and not mandated by the federal government.169 The
problem with this argument is that it entirely ignores the reality of the
American workplace. In order to have truly meaningful negotiations the
two parties must have equal bargaining power. In many employment
situations this simply is not the case. This is particularly true in small
firms where unionization is less common. 170 The suggestion that an in-
dividual should negotiate family leave with his employer is unrealistic.
The testimony before the Committee is replete with examples of the
outcome of these "negotiations".' 71 As Marsha Levnick, Executive Direc-
tor of Now Legal Defense & Education Fund states; "An employer-by-
employer approach to leave policies has failed to solve the problems of
working parents. A new federal minimum standard must be estab-
lished."172
Next it is argued that mandating family leave will force employers to
cut back on other benefits. 7 3 However, it is not clear why the mandating
of leave would force this result, particularly in light of the fact that
166 The Chamber of Commerce is convinced that if H.R. 4300 is passed it will raise labor
costs an inordinate amount and damage the United States' ability to compete abroad. See,
e.g., 60 Second Debate, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1986 § 12A, col. 4; Required Employee Leave?,
Houston Chronicle, July 28, 1986 § 1, at 11; Washington Watch: The Business Action
Network, 7 Reasons to Say 'No' to Parental Leave June 1986 (published by and available
from the Chamber of Commerce). Apparently, the Chamber of Commerce has been raising
the same objections for quite some time. As far back as 1937, the Chamber of Commerce has
criticized pro labor/employee legislation arguing it would increase the cost of labor and
unduly burden business. See Forsythe, Legislative History of the F.L.S.A., 6 LAw & CoTrrNnp.
PnomS., 464, 468 (1939).
167 The National Federation of Independent Business Lhereinafter NFIBI represents
more than 500,000 small and independent businesses. NFIB, Letter to Representative E.
Thomas Coleman, June 23, 1986 (discussing NFIBs reasons for opposing H.R. 4300)(avail-
able from NFIB, Washington, D.C.).
168 For a good summary of arguments against H.R. 4300, see Committee Report, supra
note 146 dissenting and separate dissenting views.
169 See, e.g., United States Chamber of Commerce Action Call, August 13, 1986
(available from The Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.); 60 Second Debate, supra
note 166.
17' In 1979, less than 5% of workers employed at firms with less than 25 employees were
covered by a union contract as compared with 30% of employees who worked at firms with
over 500 employees. Further, in 1983 only 1.9% of women employed by firms with less than
25 employees were under union contract. See PARENTAL AND MEncAL LFvE H.R. 4300
BIFING PAPER, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986).
171 See Committee Report, supra note 146 at 15-16.
172 60 Second Debate, supra note 166.
17. Washington Watch: The Business Action Network, Parental Leave Fight Not Over,
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employees on leave do not receive any wage replacement.174 Therefore,
even if an employer had to hire a temporary employee he would still be
paying only one salary and thus there is no basis for claiming that family
leave will divert money from other benefits. Further, current studies
indicate that the majority of employers reroute work or use internal
temporaries while an employee is on leave. 7 5
Closely tied to this argument is the argument put forth by small
businesses, to wit: many small businesses are already operating on a slim
margin, and therefore any additional fixed costs may put them out of
business.176 However, the proponents of this argument fail to demon-
strate how H.R. 4300 will raise fixed costs. Again, the mandated leave is
unpaid.177 There is no reason to believe that employing a temporary, if
needed, would cost any more than employing the regular worker.178
Finally, it is argued that H.R. 4300 will discourage employers from
hiring young employees, particularly women of childbearing years.179
The answer to this argument is simple. The PDA was passed in 1978
amidst objections that it would force an undue burden on employers'8 0
and discourage them from hiring women.' 8 ' Additionally, there are state
October, 1986 (published by and available from the Chamber of Commerce, Washington,
D.C.).
174 H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 103. The Chamber of Commerce claims that an informal
survey indicates that the net cost of a word processor taking a 41/2 month leave would be
$5,186 in Washington, D.C.; $3,363 in Houston; and $4,913 in Chicago. Washington Watch:
The Business Action Network Parental Leave Fight Not Over, October 1986. However, the
Chamber does not state how these figures were arrived at nor does it indicate what these
costs represent. This is typical of the manner in which the Chamber of Commerce presents
its arguments, i.e., sweeping proclamations with no evidence to support them.
178 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
176 Committee Report, supra note 146, at 50.
177 H.R. 4300, supra note 146, § 103.
178 It seems rather telling that the opponents of H.R. 4300 can produce no evidence as to
the effect it will have on business. It must be remembered that at least eight states already
have legislation which entitles women to take a leave of absence and which guarantees that
they can return to their job after the leave. One would think therefore, that if this type of
legislation is as damaging to business as claimed the Chamber of Commerce or like
organizations in these states would have been able to provide ample evidence as to the cost
of such leaves.
179 Committee Report, supra note 146, at 56.
160 Not surprisingly, when the PDA was being debated the Chamber of Commerce was one
of the legislation's chief opponents. Equally predictable was the nature of their argument:
Opponents of this legislation have argued that it will be too costly; but the
committee is convinced that the costs, although not negligible can be sustained
without any undue burden on employers. Written testimony submitted by the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States ... indicate the total cost of this bill
might be as high as 1.7 Billion [dollars].
S. REP. No. 95-331 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1977).
1a' W. CHAVxi, Walking a Tightrope: Pregnancy, Parenting and Work, in DoUBLE
ExPosuRE WomN's HaLTH HAZARS ON THE JoB Am AT Hoam 202 (W. Chavkin ed. 1984).
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statutes which provide for guaranteed reinstatement after maternity
leave which pre-date the PDA.182 Yet, women continue to be the largest
growing segment of the labor force.' 83 Further, it is counterproductive to
argue that a law should not be passed because it may encourage some
people to act illegally. 184 This argument appears to be an emotional ploy
aimed at intimidating those people whom H.R. 4300 seeks to protect. The
statistics prove that this type of legislation does not "backfire".185
The arguments against H.R. 4300 are specious. At first blush they
appear strong, however, further examination reveals that they are often
without merit. The opponents have been unable to produce evidence in
support of their arguments, and, at least one argument is directly refuted
by the empirical data. 186 It is clear that on balance the benefits conferred
by H.R. 4300 far outweigh any harm of an actual nature.
VI. CoNcLusION
Over the past twenty-five years the United States has undergone a
demographic revolution. These demographic changes have had a pro-
found impact on the family and the family's role in society. Due to the
steadily growing number of women in the workforce, the family is
becoming increasingly unable to perform its caregiving function. If this
problem is not remedied, the societal costs could be enormous.
Current law is unable to provide the needed remedy. The PDA does
nothing more than prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and,
it is questionable whether it has even accomplished this goal. Addition-
ally, while a small number of states have enacted state legislation, these
laws have not gone far enough. First, the state laws are applicable to
women only and, therefore, are really nothing more than extensions of
anti-discrimination statutes. Further, the vast majority of states provide
no further protection than that afforded by the PDA.
H.R. 4300 addresses the inadequacies in the present law and provides
for an equitable remedy to the problems facing the contemporary Amer-
ican family. The time has come for the United States to join the rest of the
industrialized world by ensuring adequate family leave benefits.
Ahtr K. BERLmN
182 See, e.g., Connecticut, CoN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(7)(1985); Montana, MONT. CODE
AN. § 41-2602 (1985).
183 PAmErTA AN MEDicAL LEAVE H.R. 4300 BRIFING PAPER, 99th Cong., 2d Sess 5
(1986)[hereinafter BRIEFING PAPER].
18 Failure to hire a woman on the basis of sex is a violation of Title VII.
185 See BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 183.
186 Id.
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